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of insurance may rise in the near future, ultimately the industry will de-
velop new methods of cost control in its operation. Both sound business
practice and a desire to stem consumer dissatisfaction will dictate this re-
suit.
III. CONCLUSION
In Group Life & Health the Supreme Court was presented with the task
of interpeting the phrase "business of insurance" for purposes of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act antitrust exemption. At issue specifically were Phar-
macy Agreements between Blue Shield and participating pharmacies
designed to provide policyholder benefits under a drug insurance plan.
The Court construed the business of insurance narrowly, and thereby fur-
ther limited the McCarran-Ferguson Act antitrust exemption. The Phar-
macy Agreements, as well as all provider agreements, were declared by the
Court to be outside the scope of the business of insurance because they are
merely contractual arrangements for the purchase of goods and services by
an insurance company and do not involve the underwriting and spreading
of risks. This decision parallels the growing sentiment to abolish or se-
verely limit statutory antitrust exemptions and profoundly affects every in-
surance company obligation that had relied on a provider agreement for its
performance.
Maureen A. Murry
Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. v. Commissioner:
Section 1031(a) Applied to the Exchange of
General Partnership Interests
Gulfstream Republic Properties, Inc. and Gulfstream University, Inc.
were wholly owned subsidiaries of petitioner, Gulfstream Land and Devel-
opment Corporation. In June 1971 Gulfstream Republic Properties en-
tered into a joint venture' with an unrelated corporation. In 1972
Gulfstream University entered into another joint venture with All Seasons
Development Corporation; also an unrelated corporation. Both joint ven-
tures were formed to develop and improve real estate. On July 18, 1974,
Gulfstream Republic Properties exchanged its joint venture interest for the
joint venture interest owned by All Seasons Development Corporation;
Gulfstream Republic Properties and Gulfstream University thus became
equal interest coventurers in the same joint venture. The parent, Gulf-
stream Land and Development Corporation, did not report any of the gain
it realized from the exchange on its consolidated tax return for the taxable
1. For federal income tax purposes the terms "joint venture" and "partnership" are
synonymous. See I.R.C. §§ 761(a) & 7701(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1, T.D. 7208, 1972-2
C.B. 396.
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year ending September 30, 1974, treating the transaction as a tax-free ex-
change pursuant to section 1031(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.2 The
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service assessed a deficiency
against the parent corporation, claiming that the parenthetical language of
section 103 1(a) prevents an exchange of general partnership interests from
qualifying for nonrecognition of gain treatment. In the alternative, the
Commissioner argued that the transaction was a constructive exchange of
the underlying partnership assets, which the Commissioner classified as
stock in trade held primarily for sale. Gulfstream filed suit in the Tax
Court to dispute the deficiency and moved for partial summary judgment.
Held, motion for partial summary judgment denied: An exchange of gen-
eral partnership interests will qualify for section 1031(a) nonrecognition
treatment unless scrutiny of the underlying partnership assets reveals that
the substance of the transaction is an exchange of property that would not
otherwise qualify for nonrecognition under section 1031(a). Gulfstream
Landc& Development Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587 (1979).
I. I.R.C. SECTION 1031
A. The History and Mechanics of Section 1031
Internal Revenue Code section 103 1(a) contains two basic components.5
The operative component provides mandatory nonrecognition of any gain
or loss realized when property held for investment or for productive use in
trade or business is exchanged for property of a like kind.6 The second
component parenthetically excludes "stock in trade or other property held
primarily for sale, [and] stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates
of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebted-
ness or interest ' 7 from qualifying for nonrecognition treatment.
The predecessor of the present section 103 1(a) originated in the Revenue
2. I.R.C. § 1031(a) provides:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in trade
or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or otherproperty held
primarilyfor sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust
or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest)
is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held either for productive
use in trade or business or for investment.
(Emphasis added.)
3. Stock in trade held primarily for sale, ie., inventory, is a type of property expressly
excluded from nonrecognition treatment by the parenthetical clause of § 1031(a). Id
4. Gulfstream originally filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to rule
120 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. The Commissioner objected and
moved to convert Gulfstream's motion to a motion for partial summary judgment pursuant
to rule 121 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. The Tax Court granted the
Commissioner's motion and thus the case was before the court on Gulfstream's motion for
partial summary judgment. See Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
587, 588 n.1 (1979).
5. See generally 11975] 61-3d TAX MNGM'T (BNA) for the requirements of§ 103 1(a).
6. The nonrecognition provision of I.R.C. § 103 1(a) is nonelective and cannot be vol-
untarily waived. See United States v. Vardine, 305 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1962). Compare
I.R.C. § 1031 with id § 1033.
7. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
Act of 1921.8 After several amendments, the section was enacted in its
present form in 1928.' The congressional policy behind the provision is to
permit a "paper" gain to escape taxation temporarily when a taxpayer's
original investment remains unliquidated.'l The predecessor of section
1031(a) parenthetically excluded from nonrecognition treatment stock in
trade or other property similarly held for sale." The provisions of the
1921 Act, however, were applied liberally to allow tax-free exchanges of all
types of like-kind property, including the tax-free exchange of appreciated
stock for other stock and bonds. ' 2 Many taxpayers abused this liberal con-
struction by trading in appreciated securities without incurring tax liabil-
8. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, ch. 136, § 202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 230 (codified
following amendment at I.R.C. § 1031(a)). Even before the Revenue Act of 1921 was en-
acted by Congress, a treasury regulation issued under the Revenue Act of 1918 excepted
certain exchanges from the general rule requiring recognition of gain or loss. The regulation
provided that no gain or loss from the exchange of property would be recognized unless
there was (a) a change in the substance of the property and not merely the form and (b) a
change of the property into the equivalent of cash. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1563, T.D. 2971, 2
C.B. 38 (1920). For a discussion of the legislative history of § 1031, see Comment, Section
1031." Like Kind Exchanges of Partnership Interests, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 168, 169 (1976). See
generally 3 J. MERTEN S, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20.21, at 79 (rev. ed.
1972).
9. Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562, ch. 852, § 112(b)(1), 45 Stat. 816 (now codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 1031(a)).
10. The report of the Senate Committee on Finance relating to this portion of the Reve-
nue Act of 1921 stated: "Section 202 (subdivision c) provides new rules for those exchanges
or 'trades' in which, although a technical 'gain' may be realized under the present law, the
taxpayer actually realizes no cash profit." S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921).
See also H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934), in which the House Committee
on Ways and Means reported on the Revenue Act of 1934. In the section of the report
concerned with the tax-free exchange provision the Committee stated:
[I]f the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the same kind of property as that in
which it was originally invested, he is not allowed to compute and deduct his
theoretical loss on the exchange, nor is he charged with a tax upon his theoret-
ical profit. The calculation of the profit or loss is deferred until it is realized in
cash, marketable securities, or other property not of the same kind having a
fair market value.
Id. One court has suggested that the legislative purpose behind the section was to reduce the
administrative complications of valuing property received in an exchange. See Century
Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954
(1952), in which the court stated that reduction of administrative complications was the
reason for § 1031's enactment. This explanation, however, has been rejected as having no
support in legislative history. See Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.
1959). The court in Jordan Marsh, addressing the interpretation of the legislative history in
Century Electric, stated:
Congress was primarily concerned with the inequity, in the case of an ex-
change, of forcing a taxpayer to recognize a paper gain which was still tied up
in a continuing investment of the same sort. . . . These considerations, rather
than concern for the difficulty of the administrative task of making the valua-
tions . . . were at the root of the Congressional purpose in enacting
[§ 103 l(a)].
Id at 456 (footnote omitted).
11. See Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, ch. 136, § 202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 230. See also
Comment, supra note 8, at 170.
12. See Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 308 (1929) (decided under the
1921 Act allowing the tax-free exchange of stock for bonds and stock); Greene v. Commis-
sioner, 15 B.T.A. 401 (1929), aft'd, 42 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1930) (allowing the tax-free ex-
change of stock for railway bonds under the 1921 Act).
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ity.' 3 This loophole was closed by an amendment in 1923 that added
"stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or beneficial
interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest" to the
parenthetical clause of the 1921 provision. 4 The legislative history of the
1923 amendment and subsequent exchange provisions clearly indicate that
Congress intended only to close this specific tax loophole and not to elimi-
nate a larger class of property from the tax-free exchange provision. 5
B. Prior Resolution of Section 1031 as Applied to Exchanges of
Partnership Interests
Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service recently have ad-
dressed the question of whether an exchange of general partnership inter-
ests qualifies for nonrecognition treatment pursuant to section 1031(a).' 6
Cases dealing with such exchanges have focused on two major issues. One
issue is the potential inclusion of a general partnership interest within the
scope of the parenthetical clause of section 1031. The Service consistently
has argued that the parenthetical clause precludes the tax-free exchange of
general partnership interests."V The second issue is the extent to which an
exchange of partnership interests satisfies the like-kind requirement of sec-
tion 1031(a). The regulations state that "the words 'like kind' have refer-
ence to the nature or character of the property and not to its grade or
13. In a letter dated Jan. 13, 1923, to the Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, the Secretary of the Treasury stated: "This provision of the act is being widely
abused. Many brokers, investment houses, and bond houses have established exchange de-
partments and are advertising that they will exchange securities for their customers in such a
manner as to result in no taxable gain." H.R. REP. No. 1432, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 1 (1923).
14. Act of March 4, 1923, Pub. L. No. 545, ch. 294, 42 Stat. 1560.
15. The original bill for the 1923 amendment introduced in the House of Representa-
tives and recommended by the House Ways and Means Committee would have eliminated
all property held for investment from the tax-free exchange provision. But when the bill
reached the floor for debate, the House amended it to restore the whole class of investment
property to the provision and added only the language describing securities and similar type
property to the parenthetical exclusion clause. See 64 CONG. REC. 2854 (1923).
A House Ways and Means Committee report on the reenactment of the tax-free exchange
provision in the Revenue Act of 1934 described the section as follows:
The law has provided for 12 years that gain or loss is recognized on exchanges
of property having a fair market value, such as stocks, bonds, and negotiable
instruments ... but not on other exchanges of property solely for property of
like kind. In other words, profit or loss is recognized in the case of exchanges
of notes or securities, which are essentially like money ....
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
16. See Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311 (1972), nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3,
afdper curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974); Miller v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9606 (S.D. Ind. June 14, 1963); Rev. Rul. 78-135, 1978-1 C.B. 256.
17. The parenthetical clause of § 103 1(a) contains several terms that describe a broad
range of property interests. The IRS arguably could classify a partnership interest as any
one of the several property interests described in the parenthetical clause. It is unlikely,
however, that the Service could classify partnership interests as stocks, bonds, notes, certifi-
cates of trust of beneficial interest, or evidences of indebtedness. The terms "choses in ac-
tion," "securities," and "evidences of interest" are more vague and provide the Service with
greater opportunity to argue that they encompass a partnership interest. For a discussion of
the potential of classifying a partnership interest as a chose in action or security, see Boyd &
Heller, Like-Kind Exchanges of Partnership Interests: A Comprehensive Analsis, 3 REV.
TAX. INDIVIDUALS 87, 89-95 (1979). See also Comment, supra note 8, at 175-77.
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quality." '8
In Miller v. United States, 9 a United States district court decision, the
taxpayer exchanged his fifty percent interest in a tavern partnership for a
twenty-five percent partnership interest in a home and auto supply store.
The court held, without discussion, that the exchange of partnership inter-
ests was an exchange of like-kind property qualifying for nonrecognition
under section 103 1(a).2" The court reasoned that the plaintiffs investment
in the partnership interest received was a continuation of the old invest-
ment still unliquidated. Also without discussion, the court further stated
that the partnership interests transferred were not property interests in-
cluded in the parenthetical clause of section 1031(a).2
The Miller court apparently did not examine the nature of the underly-
ing partnership assets. Examining the transaction solely at the partnership
interest level, only the partnership interests actually exchanged were re-
quired to pass the tests of section 103 1(a). Both partnerships held notes
and inventory, which are types of property ineligible for nonrecognition
treatment. 22 Thus, if the court had viewed the transaction as a construc-
tive exchange of partnership assets, the exchange would not have been
completely tax-free.23
The Tax Court also permitted a tax-free exchange of general partnership
interests in Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner.24 In Meyer father and son
each held a one-half interest in a California general partnership. In the
same transaction, both partners exchanged a portion of their general part-
nership interest for a part interest in a limited partnership. Meyer, Sr. re-
ceived a fifteen percent limited partner interest, while Meyer, Jr. received a
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-I(b), T.D. 6935, 1967-2 C.B. 272. To qualify for nonrecog-
nition of gain under § 103 1(a), the exchange must involve like-kind properties. Recent cases
suggest that any exchange of realty for realty or personalty for personalty will meet the like-
kind test. State law determines whether the property is realty or personalty. See, e.g., Helis
v. Usry, 464 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972) (property held for productive use in overseas oil explo-
ration exchanged for productive property in the same business); Fleming v. Commissioner,
241 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1957) (limited overriding royalty or oil payment interests exchanged
for a ranch and urban business property); Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.
1941) (undivided interest in minerals in unimproved country land exchanged for undivided
interest in improved city land). But see Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260
(1958) (an exchange of realty for realty was not allowed, but the decision was based on
precluding the anticipatory assignment of income). Both the Uniform Partnership Act and
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act regard partnership interests as personalty. UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 26; UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18. This suggests that
partnership interests could be like-kind property. See also Comment, supra note 8, at 177-
78.
19. 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9606 (S.D. Ind. June 14, 1963).
20. Id at 89,453.
21. Id
22. Id at 89,452.
23. The Miller case has been criticized for its failure to consider the underlying partner-
ship assets. One commentator noted that the court permitted the completely tax-free ex-
change of the partnership interests even though the underlying assets contained some boot
property. See Huskins, Section 1031 Like-Kind Property Exchanges: Possibilities and Pit-
falls, 30 S. CAL. TAX. INST. 459, 500 (1978).
24. 58 T.C. 311 (1972), nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3, afl'dper curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.
1974).
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twenty percent general partner interest in the limited partnership. Both
partnerships involved in the transaction owned and operated rental apart-
ments. The Commissioner insisted that both exchanges were ineligible for
nonrecognition treatment because the partnership interests were choses in
action, a type of property specifically excluded from section 103 1(a) by the
parenthetical clause.25 The Tax Court, focusing broadly on the legislative
history of the section, rejected the Commissioner's argument and con-
cluded that Congress only intended to eliminate "investment securities or
similar intangibles" from the nonrecognition provision by its 1923 amend-
ment expanding the parenthetical clause.26 The court thus determined
that a partnership interest is not included within the scope of the paren-
thetical clause of section 1031(a) as a chose in action or under any of the
other parenthetical terms.27
The Commissioner was successful, however, in his argument that
Meyer, Sr.'s exchange of a general partnership interest for a limited part-
nership interest was not an exchange of like-kind property.28 The court
noted several differences in the undertakings of a general and a limited
partner and concluded that the variations were "substantial enough to
warrant invocation of the principle calling for strict construction of the
exceptions to the rule that where gain is involved it will be recognized and
taxed when it is realized.",29 The court also held that Meyer, Jr.'s exchange
of one general partnership interest for another was a like-kind exchange,
25. 58 T.C. at 313. The Commissioner relied on two cases, Blodgett v. Silberman, 277
U.S. 1 (1928), and McClennen v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942), claiming that
these decisions classified a partnership interest as a chose in action. The Tax Court, how-
ever, pointed out that these cases merely characterized the rights of a deceased partner's
personal representative to an accounting and cash liquidation as a chose in action. Never-
theless, some cases appear to classify a partnership interest as a chose in action. See Com-
missioner v. Smith, 173 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818 (1949) (sale of a
partnership interest described as a sale of an intangible asset or chose in action); Humphrey
v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 280, 283 (1935). One commentator has also acknowledged that
a general partnership interest may be a chose in action. 1 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXA-
TION § 26.07, at 339 (2d ed. 1976).
26. 58 T.C. at 313. The court reasoned: "We are not dealing with trading in investment
securities or similar intangibles. The transactions . . . were exchanges of proprietary (part-
nership) interests in one small business solely for proprietary (partnership) interests in a
second small business. ... 1d; see notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
27. The court stated: "In our view, however, the clause excluding exchanges of stock,
bonds, etc., is not called into play by the facts of this case ...." 58 T.C. at 313. See also 2
W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS, 15.0412], at 15-29 (1977); Boyd & Heller, supra note 17, at 89-95.
28. 58 T.C. at 314. The holding that limited and general partnership interests are not
like-kind property rejects the rationale of recent cases suggesting that any exchange of per-
sonalty for personalty is a like-kind exchange. See note 18 supra.
29. 58 T.C. at 314. Since § 1031(a) is an exception to the general rule requiring tax
recognition of gain or loss realized on an exchange of property, it must be strictly construed.
See Black v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90, 94 (1960); Midfield Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 39
B.T.A. 1154, 1157 (1939), acq., 1939-2 C.B. 25; Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1 (1960). The court
noted that limited partner interests and general partner interests differ in the personal liabil-
ity of the partner, priority in liquidation, and dissolution upon the death of a partner. 58
T.C. at 314. The Tax Court's holding that limited and general partnership interests are not
like-kind property was the only issue appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed per curiam. Estate of Meyer v, Commissioner, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974). Com-
pare this holding with I.R.C. § 1036.
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citing Miller with approval.3"
The Tax Court's approval of Miller indicates that the nature of the un-
derlying partnership assets was not a factor in the decision and that the
court viewed the transaction solely at the partnership interest level. The
court's examination of the different characteristics of a general and limited
partnership also suggests that the like-kind determination was made at the
partnership interest level.3 ' In the last paragraph of its opinion, however,
the court limited its holding to a "situation where both partnerships owned
the same type of underlying assets-in this case, rental real estate."32
Thus, it appears that the nature of the underlying partnership assets was at
least a consideration in the court's decision.33 It remained an open ques-
tion, however, as to what extent the court in the future would look beyond
the partnership interest level to the underlying assets.
34
The Internal Revenue Service has declared its nonacquiescence to the
Meyer decision, maintaining its opposition to the tax-free exchange of
generalpartnership interests.35 In 1978 the Service issued Revenue Ruling
78-1353 expressing its present position on the subject. 37 Instead of classi-
fying a general partnership interest as a chose in action as was done in
Meyer, the Service now asserts that a partnership interest is incorporated
into the parenthetical language as an "evidence of. . . interest.",38 As fur-
ther support for its position, the Service states that section 74139 requires,
30. 58 T.C. at 314. This point was not contested by the Commissioner.
31. See Boyd & Heller, supra note 17, at 96 & 97.
32. 58 T.C. at 314. Judge Dawson, dissenting, argued that since the underlying assets of
the partnerships were of "crucial importance" to the majority in determining whether the
general partnership interests were of like kind, the exchange of Meyer, Sr. should also have
been found to be a like-kind exchange. To be consistent, the examination of the Meyer, Sr.
exchange also should have focused on the underlying partnership assets and not the differ-
ence in the nature of the partnership interests exchanged. Because the underlying assets
were the same, the exchange of a limited partnership interest for general partnership interest
should also be found to be a like-kind exchange. Judge Dawson rejected this approach,
however, and viewed the exchange of a general partnership interest for a limited partnership
interest as an exchange of like-kind property of different "quality, grade, or value." Id at
315-16.
33. Three commentators have stated that the caveat suggests that the like-kind test must
be satisfied at both the partnership interest and partnership asset levels. 2 W. McKEE, W.
NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 27, 15.04[3][a].
34. For a discussion of the implications of the Meyer and Miller decisions with regard
to I.R.C. § 741 and partnership liabilities, see Comment, supra note 8, at 178-82.
35. 1975-1 C.B. 3.
36. 1978-1 C.B. 256.
37. Revenue Ruling 78-135 has been criticized by many commentators who agree that
the Service has no support for the ruling's arguments and that it ignores the holdings in both
Meyer and Miller. See I A. WILLIS, supra note 25, § 26.07 (Supp. 1979); Boyd & Heller,
supra note 17, at 93; Burton & Pennell, Shop Talk, 49 J. TAX. 63 (1978).
38. 1978-1 C.B. at 257. The ruling states:
The language in the parenthetical clause of section 1031(a) of the Code in part
encompasses all types of equity interests in financial enterprises other than by
direct ownership of the underlying property. Because a partnership interest
represents such an equity interest, it comes within the ambit of the parentheti-
cal clause of section 1031(a).
39. I.R.C. § 741 provides:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain or loss
shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss shall be consid-
1979] NO TES 1111
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without exception to section 103 1(a), the recognition of gain or loss on an
exchange of partnership interests.'
II. GULFSTREAM LAND & DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. COMMISSIONER
In Gulfstream a subsidiary of the taxpayer exchanged its joint venture
interest in a real estate development for an interest in a similar joint ven-
ture owned by an unrelated corporation. Both joint ventures were oper-
ated as general partnerships and owned the same type of underlying assets.
The Tax Court was presented with the issue of whether an exchange of
general partnership interests qualifies for nonrecognition treatment pursu-
ant to section 1031(a).
The taxpayer, citing Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner,4 argued that the
transaction qualified for nonrecognition treatment. The Commissioner
countered with three arguments claiming that the transaction was a taxa-
ble event. The first two arguments reiterated the Service's position in Rev-
enue Ruling 78-135.42 The Commissioner first contended that general
partnership interests are a type of equity interest described in the paren-
thetical clause of section 1031(a). The Commissioner also argued that sec-
tion 741 overrides section 1031 and thus requires gain to be recognized
upon the sale or exchange of any partnership interest. In addition, the
Commissioner insisted that this transaction was a constructive exchange of
stock in trade.
Emphasizing its opinion in Meyer, the Tax Court rejected the Commis-
sioner's argument that the scope of the parenthetical clause includes a gen-
eral partnership interest.43 The court stated that its "opinion in Meyer
[was] not based solely on a rejection of [the Commissioner's] chose in ac-
tion argument, but rather [was] founded on a broad analysis of the legisla-
tive history of section 1031(a)." 44 Thus, the court declined to hold that
general partnership interests are "evidences of interest" as that language is
used in the parenthetical clause of section 1031(a). 45 The court did not
reach the Commissioner's argument that section 741 requires, without ex-
ception to section 1031(a), that gain be recognized upon the sale or ex-
ered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset, except as
otherwise provided in section 751 (relating to unrealized receivables and in-
ventory items which have appreciated substantially in value).
40. The Commissioner argues that the word "shall" in the first sentence of § 741 re-
quires the recognition of gain to the transferor. The Commissioner bases this interpretation
on the holding of the Tax Court in Pollack v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 142 (1977). In Pollack
the Tax Court held that the word "shall" in the second sentence of § 741 required
mandatory capital asset treatment. By analogy the Commissioner argued that the word
"shall" in the first sentence should be interpreted to require mandatory tax recognition. See
Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 13-15,
Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587 (1979).
41. 58 T.C. 311 (1976), nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3, afdper curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.
1974).
42. 1978-1 C.B. 256; see text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
43. 71 T.C. at 593.
44. Id; see notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
45. 71 T.C. at 594.
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change of a partnership interest. Since the court had already decided that
an exchange of partnership interests qualifies for section 1031 (a), presuma-
bly it found no need to discuss the issue.4 6
Because the Gulfstream litigation began before Revenue Ruling 78-135
was issued, 7 the ruling itself was not subject to the Tax Court's scrutiny.
The court in Gu/fslream, however, rejected the substance of that ruling's
interpretation of the parenthetical clause. To the extent the Service main-
tains the position that an exchange of partnership interests does not qualify
for nonrecognition treatment, it can no longer justifiably base its position
on an interpretation of the parenthetical clause. Revenue Ruling 78-135
should be withdrawn by the Internal Revenue Service because its interpre-
tations of section 1031(a) have been rejected for a second time by the Tax
Court.
After holding that a general partnership interest is not described by the
parenthetical clause, the Tax Court tested the transaction under the gen-
eral requirements of section 1031(a).48 The court noted that the joint ven-
ture interests exchanged were like-kind property49 and were held for
productive use in trade or business. The court then stated that the lan-
guage of section 1031(a) focuses only on the property actually ex-
changed." In Gufstream, as in Meyer, partnership interests were
exchanged, and not the underlying partnership assets. Thus, at the part-
nership interest level, the court found that the transaction met all the re-
quirements of section 1031(a).5 '
The Commissioner, however, urged the court to look behind the part-
nership interests exchanged to the underlying partnership assets.52 He ar-
gued that the transaction was a constructive exchange of stock in trade
held primarily for sale. The court, persuaded by this argument, noted that
the legislative history of section 1031 (a) indicates a clear congressional pol-
46. This argument appears to be a tenuous one, nevertheless. One commentator calls
the argument "patently incorrect." I A. WILLIS, supra note 25, § 26.07 (Supp. 1979). An-
other asserts that "the analysis is 'pure invention.' " Burton & Pennell, supra note 37, at 64.
The legislative history behind § 741 reveals no suggestion that Congress considered the
section as a mandatory recognition provision. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
70, 71 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1954). Furthermore, there are other
nonrecognition provisions in the Internal Revenue Code that apply to the exchange of part-
nership interests. The regulations specifically acknowledge that § 351 will allow the tax-free
transfer of a partnership interest to a corporation for shares in the corporation. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.741-1(c) (1957). Therefore, § 741 does not appear to be a mandatory recognition provi-
sion.
47. Taxpayer's petition for relief was filed in the Tax Court on Jan. 14, 1977. Revenue
Ruling 78-135 wa's not issued until Apr. 10, 1978.
48. 71 T.C. at 594; see note 5 supra.
49. 71 T.C. at 594. It was unchallenged in Gulfstream, as in Meyer, that an exchange of
one general partnership interest for another is an exchange of like-kind property. See note
30 supra and accompanying text. It appears that the Tax Court agrees that the like-kind test
is to be applied at the partnership interest level for purposes of § 1031(a).
50. 71 T.C. at 595.
5 1. Id. at 594.
52. Id. See generally Andelman, Reorganizations of Partnerships, 35 N.Y.U. INST. FED.
TAX. 151, 154 (1977); Blankenship, After the Meyer Case. An Analysis of Tax-Free Partner-
ship Exchanges, 38 J. TAX. 278, 279 (1973).
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icy to prohibit the tax-free exchange of inventory-type assets.53 In order to
justify an examination of the underlying partnership assets, the court
stated that the caveat in Meyer indicates that it will carefully analyze any
partnership interests exchanged to determine if section 103 1(a) should ap-
ply and to ensure that the provision is not abused.54 The court further
stated that the language in the Meyer caveat "referring to scrutiny of the
underlying assets of the partnerships is directed to the detection of such
abuse."55 The court recognized, however, that scrutiny of the underlying
partnership assets would be in conflict with its reading of section 103 1(a)
as requiring that the transaction meet the section 1031 (a) tests solely at the
partnership interest level.
56
In resolving this dilemma the court invoked the judicial doctrine of
"substance over form,"57 reasoning that the substance of this transaction
may be an exchange of assets that Congress had declared ineligible for
nonrecognition treatment even though the form of the transaction satisfies
the requirements of section 1031(a).58 The court also stated that its scru-
tiny of the underlying assets in Meyer was an application of the substance
over form doctrine, although in Meyer the court found that the form of the
transaction accurately reflected its substance.59 Since the extent that the
underlying partnership assets in Gulfstream constituted stock in trade was
still an issue of fact, the court denied petitioner's motion for partial sum-
mary judgment.6°
The Tax Court's holding in Gulfstream further clouds the issue, left un-
answered in Meyer, of under what circumstances the court will scrutinize
the exchange of partnership interests at the partnership asset level rather
than at the partnership interest level. It now appears, however, that to
some extent the partnership exchange transaction may be analyzed at ei-
ther level, depending on the result the court is attempting to reach. If the
court desires to prevent the exchange of a limited partnership interest for a
general partnership interest, as in Meyer, it will examine the transaction on
the partnership interest level. If, however, the court's goal is to prevent the
53. 71 T.C. at 594; see S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921); note II supra
and accompanying text.
54. 71 T.C. at 595; see text accompanying note 32 supra.
55. 71 T.C. at 594.
56. Id at 595.
57. The court stated that "the form of a transaction will not be given effect for tax
purposes if the substance of the transaction would yield a contrary tax result." Id. at 595;
see Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Smith v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 972 (8th
Cir. 1976) (substance over form doctrine applied in the context of a tax-free exchange);
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968) (substance over form
doctrine applied to a like-kind exchange). See generally 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 8,
§ 20.16.
58. The court noted that "even though the form of the exchange here fills the require-
ments of section 103 1(a), we . . . must look at the underlying assets . . . to decide whether
the form of the transaction accurately reflects its substance." 71 T.C. at 595.
59. Id
60. Upon a motion for partial summary judgment, "[t]he existence of any reasonable
doubt as to the facts at issue must result in denial of the motion." Hoeme v. Commissioner,
63 T.C. 18, 20 (1974); see TAX CT. R. PRAC. & PROC. 121.
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tax-free exchange of the underlying partnership assets for any purpose it
deems appropriate, the court will not hesitate to scrutinize the partnership
assets and conclude that the substance of the transaction does not accu-
rately reflect its form.
Application of these two rationales on a mutually exclusive basis will
produce results inconsistent with the decided cases. For example, as Judge
Dawson correctly pointed out in his dissent in Meyer, the majority in that
case did not use a substance over form analysis.6 The substance of Meyer,
Sr.'s exchange of a general for a limited partnership interest was clearly an
exchange of like-kind property at the partnership asset level.62 Yet the
majority in Meyer analyzed that transaction at the partnership interest
level and found that the exchange of a general for a limited partnership
interest was not an exchange of like-kind property.63 Conversely, the Tax
Court in Gulfstream found that the exchange of one general partnership
interest for another met all the requirements of the statute at the partner-
ship interest level,' but upon application of the substance over form doc-
trine the transaction failed at the partnership asset level.65
The Tax Court's analysis in Gufstream of the transaction at both the
partnership interest and asset levels still produces inadequate results. The
congressional policy of gain recognition on the exchange of certain assets
cannot be fully complied with by the court's use of the substance over form
doctrine to analyze the transaction at the partnership asset level. The doc-
trine will continue to permit the tax-free treatment of many exchanges on
which some gain would be recognized under section 1031 if the underlying
partnership assets themselves had been exchanged. For example, in Gu/-
stream the facts presented to the court indicate one of the joint ventures
involved in the exchange held installment notes receivable from the sales
of improved lots and homes.66 A reading of the Gulfstream and Meyer
opinions suggests that if the court later found the real estate held by the
joint ventures exchanged in Gu±fstream not to be stock in trade, the part-
nership exchange transaction would be permitted totally tax-free.6 7 The
substance of such a transaction presumably would be considered as the
exchange of property qualifying for section 1031 (a). If, however, the joint
venture assets themselves had been exchanged, the installment notes re-
61. 58 T.C. at 315.
62. See note 32 supra.
63. See notes 28, 29 & 31 supra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
66. 71 T.C. at 590, 591 n.5.
67. The facts in the Meyer opinion indicate that the underlying assets of each partner-
ship interest exchanged were encumbered by mortgage. 58 T.C. at 312. Consideration re-
ceived for the assumption of liabilities by a transferee or the transfer on property subject to
liabilities is treated as boot property requirng the recognition of gain when property other-
wise qualifying for nonrecognition under § 1031(a) is exchanged. I.R.C. § 1031(b); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1031(b)-l(c), T.D. 6935, 1967-2 C.B. 272, 276. The court, however, permitted the
completely tax-free exchange of Meyer, Jr.'s general partnership interest for another general
partnership interest, finding that the substance of the transaction accurately reflected its
form. 71 T.C. at 595.
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ceivable would trigger the recognition of gain on the transaction. 6 This
shielding of gain recognition is exactly the abuse the court attempted to
prevent in Gulfstream. It is inappropriate to permit on one hand a com-
pletely tax-free exchange of general partnership interests if the underlying
partnership assets include any amount of cash, nonqualifying, or non-like-
kind property as long as the assets are not predominately stock in trade
and, on the other hand, to refuse to permit a tax-free exchange of general
partnership interests if the underlying assets happen to be predominately
stock in trade.
The Tax Court in Guffstream also failed to indicate what amount of
inventory or other nonqualifying property would be permitted in the un-
derlying partnership assets before the court would find that the substance
of the transaction did not accurately reflect its form. It is clear from the
Meyer opinion, however, that the court will allow the underlying partner-
ship assets to contain some nonqualifying property and still permit the
transaction to be eligible for nonrecognition treatment.69 Only by the use
of the vague judicial doctrine of substance over form can the court distin-
guish cases in which the amount of nonqualified property in the underly-
ing partnership assets is sufficient to deny section 103 1(a) treatment to an
exchange of general partnership interest. This approach creates uncer-
tainty and prevents taxpayers from structuring a transaction for which they
can be assured nonrecognition treatment.
The Tax Court could restore consistency while preventing the abuses of
section 1031 (a) it sought to curtail in GCufstream by expanding upon its
rationale in Gulfstream and adopting an aggregate theory of partnership
when analyzing an exchange of partnership interests.7" The aggregate the-
ory treates the exchange of partnership interests as if the underlying assets
themselves are exchanged. Application of this concept requires the com-
plete fragmentation of each partnership interest exchanged where multiple
underlying assets and liabilities are involved. The tests of section 1031(a)
would then be applied to each underlying partnership asset. Although this
approach focuses on the partnership asset level only and therefore would
permit an exchange of limited for general partnership interests, the trans-
68. Notes receivable are a type of nonqualifying property interest described by the par-
enthetical clause of I.R.C. § 1031(a). See note 2 supra. Section 1031(b) requires the recogni-
tion of gain realized to the extent of any money or nonqualifying property received in an
exchange otherwise qualifying for § 1031(a).
69. See note 67 supra.
70. The aggregate theory of partnership taxation treats each partner as owning a direct
interest in each partnership asset and taxes him directly on his share of partnership income.
Under the entity theory the partnership is considered to be a separate entity from the part-
ners. The partnership itself owns property and transacts business. Subchapter K of the
Internal Revenue Code (partnership taxation rules) applies the aggregate theory for some
purposes and the entity theory for other purposes. The United States Supreme Court has
stated: "The legislative history indicates, and the commentators agree, that partnerships are
entities for purposes of calculating and filing informational returns but that they are con-
duits through which the taxpaying obligation passes to the individual partners in accord
with their distributive shares." United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 n.8 (1973). See
generally I W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 27, 1.02; I A. WILLIS,
supra note 25, §§ 2.01-04.
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